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Abstract—This paper maps different investor strategies in
the offshore wind energy market based on data from existing
wind farms in the UK. This is realized through the
employment of cluster analysis, which classifies offshore
wind energy investors – who have purchased equity stakes-
in terms of the entry timing, exit timing, purchase timing and
stake purchased. We, then, perform a SWOT analysis to
identify the major strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and
threats encountered by each cluster of stakeholders. Cluster
analysis revealed the existence of three distinct investment
strategy profiles: i) Late entry investors, ii) Pre-
commissioning investors, and iii) Own-build-transfer
investors. Corporate and institutional investors tend to be
late entry investors, whose strategy is based on buying assets
while they are fully operational avoiding construction risks,
retaining a risk aversion profile. The exit timing of OEMs
and EPCI contractors usually takes place before or right
after the commissioning of the wind farm. Finally, major
Utilities tend to keep the operating assets on their balance
sheet and divest only part of them (mostly minority stakes)
during the operating stage; Independent energy companies
are found in both 2nd and 3rd cluster; however, exceptions
may be observed.
Keywords — equity capital investors, offshore wind, cluster
analysis, entry and exit timings, investment strategies, SWOT
I. NOMENCLATURE
CfD: Contracts for Difference
OEM: Original Equipment Manufacturer
EPCI: Engineering, Procurement, Construction and
Installation
WACC: Weighted average cost of capital
PPA: Power purchase Agreement
O&M: Operation and Maintenance
LEI: Late-entry investors
PCI: Pre-commissioning investors
OBTI: Own-build-transfer investors
II. INTRODUCTION
Wind energy has become a significant part of the energy
mix within the UK and Europe. It is now established as a
mainstream rather than a developing technology, with a
mature supply chain. Offshore wind offers favorable
conditions for high yield energy production with higher
wind shear, abundant available space and limited social
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impact. Currently, offshore wind farms with capacities
similar to those of conventional energy technologies are
already built, with higher capacity projects in the pipeline.
Within the existing market, a variety of investors exists
with different investment strategies and appetite for risk.
Acknowledging the vast uncertainties within the offshore
wind energy sector, it becomes pertinent to identify means
to systematically assess uncertainty with respect to service
life valuation, hence supporting decisions of investors.
Each investor develops their bespoke assessment and
valuation framework projecting revenues and costs, in
order to decide effectively their potential entry and exit
instances of the offshore wind farm life-cycle.
As far as revenues are concerned in the United
Kingdom, there is currently a transition from the
Renewables Obligation (RO) scheme (set to finish on the
31st of March 2017) to the Contracts for Difference (CfD)
scheme. According to the CfD scheme, an electricity
generation party with CfD is paid the difference between
the constant “strike price” and the average UK market
price for electricity - “reference price”. If the reference
price is higher than the strike price, the generation party
has to pay back the difference. Bottom line is that company
always gets the strike price for electricity generated. The
scheme lasts for 15 years (while the average lifetime of an
offshore wind energy asset is 25 years), after which the
electricity output is sold on the average UK electricity
market price, hence imposing uncertainty to the revenues
yielded by the investment after the 15th year of operation
[1].
The present paper aims at mapping different investor
strategies followed by stakeholders in the offshore wind
industry in terms of a number of factors through a cluster
analysis [2], by processing data obtained from industry for
existing installations; we, then, distinguish the major
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats applied to
each cluster of stakeholders. The study focuses on offshore
wind farms installed in the UK sites, but the methodology
can be applied in different regions.
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III. THE EXISTING LANDSCAPE OF THE UK OFFSHORE
WIND ENERGY INVESTORS
Offshore wind (OW) is one of the most rapidly growing
markets of all RE technologies. By the end of 2016, there
are 3,589 offshore wind turbines with a combined capacity
of 12,631 MW fully grid connected in European waters in
82 wind farms across 11 countries, including
demonstration sites [3]. The UK is the world’s largest
generator of electricity from offshore wind, meeting
around 5% of annual demand, which is expected to reach
10% by 2020 [4]. Total installed capacity is 5,156MW,
representing 40.8% of the total installed capacity
worldwide.
Although offshore wind is a proven technology with an
expanding supply chain, with the technology’s levelised
cost of electricity still being relatively high, in the region
of 118£/MWh [5], the issue of financing is of major
importance. To this end, debt and equity investors along
with innovative financing structures are required to
support the further deployment of offshore wind.
During the initial stages of the offshore wind market
development, major Utilities have been the main investors,
bearing all risks from the consenting up to the
decommissioning stage of the investment. With the scaling
up of the market, new entrants became active in different
aspects of the business. Currently, market comprises of a
diverse pool of equity investors: Utilities, OEMs (Original
Equipment Manufacturers) and EPCI contractors
(Engineering, Procurement, Construction and
Installation), Independent Power Producers, Pension
Funds, Infrastructure Funds, Institutional investors, and
Sovereign wealth funds. Different classes of investors
usually accept to uptake risks of higher or lower magnitude
and of different nature; while, a considerable number of
Banks have gained experience in lending to projects and
taking construction risks as well [6], improving the
financial landscape of the sector.
Corporate finance is dominant in the European offshore
wind energy sector, according to which both debt and
equity are raised at corporate level (owner’s balance
sheet), with the corporation’s weighted average cost of
capital being the weighted average of the required returns
as determined by the market. On the other hand, in project
finance, funding is raised at the level of each project,
individually. Since, project finance investments apply only
to the given project, the cost of capital considered provides
a good insight for the effective cost of capital of the project
and hence the discount rate [7]. Nevertheless, project
finance has been underused by power producers since it
was considered too expensive; further, the risk of
damaging their credit rating is higher, while the due
diligence processes are quite time consuming [6].
3. CLUSTER ANALYSIS OF INVESTORS IN THE OFFSHORE
WIND INDUSTRY
Cluster analysis partitions data into groups so that
everything within a group are similar, but different to
everything outside that group [8]. A cluster analysis of
investors in the offshore wind industry was employed to
identify whether specific elements from specific groups of
investors can be detected. The analysis gathers knowledge
gained by the existing UK offshore wind installations
based on data collected from desktop research (e.g. 4C
Offshore online database [9] and market reports/online
announcements such as: Centrica Company news).
A. Selection of variables and data collection
The ‘objects’ to be clustered in this analysis are the
offshore wind energy investors who have acquired a stake
in offshore wind energy projects and the ‘observations’
are: entry timing, exit timing, purchase timing and stake
purchased. There are numerous additional variables that
could be considered depending on the aim of the grouping
task. Such variables include: the value of stake, the
capacity of the wind farms, the O&M costs, the capital
cost, the corporate WACC, the divestment stakes and
timings, among others. We, nevertheless, focused on
above-mentioned parameters since the focus of the study
is to explore whether there are distinct trends of investment
timings throughout the life of the offshore wind farm,
along with the ownership share that different types of
investors are willing to buy.
To normalize the data acquired from all currently
operating UK offshore wind energy projects investigated
(so as to eliminate specificities of each project with regards
to the timing of the investment e.g. due to delays during
the licensing process or other stages), a scaling of the
timing was adopted which is illustrated in Table 1. The
scaling was considered appropriate, taking into account
that offshore wind projects have often very different
characteristics to each other. For instance, the construction
of a project with high total power capacity (over 500MW)
will probably last longer (since it would require more
complex installation operations) than the construction of a
lower capacity one, while a project whose location is more
likely to cause public opposition or has higher
environmental impacts may be subject to longer licensing
processes. Since this study focuses on the stage each type
of investor enters, exits and purchases stake, rather than
the actual year before or after the commission of the
project, the time scaling of Table 1 was assigned to the
observations (exit, entry, purchase timing).
Table 1 Time scaling of the different stages of an offshore wind
farm
Offshore wind energy life stages Scaling
Consenting period (from pre-consenting up to consent
authorization) -3
Production and acquisition -2
Construction and installation -1
Commissioning 0
Operation and maintenance (throughout the 5 year
OEM warranty) 1
Operation and maintenance (following the 5 year OEM
warranty) 2
Long Term Operation (towards Decommissioning) 3
B. Results
Cluster analysis starts with a data matrix, where objects
are rows and observations are columns. Results of the
cluster analysis method applied to operating installations,
indicated the formation of distinct groups following
similar strategies in terms of their entry, exit, purchase (of
equity stake of the investment) timing, as well as the stake
purchased.
The resulting scores in the afore-mentioned
observations vary among the different stakeholders. A
hierarchical cluster analysis was employed, using SPSS
software, to maximize the variability between clusters and
minimize distance between objects of the same cluster [2].
Following the calculation of the distances between the
objects (using the “squared Euclidean distance”), next step
in the clustering process is to determine the number of
clusters. The dendrogram in Fig. 1 shows the sequence by
which the observations and clusters were merged. As
mentioned above, the objects of the analysis are the equity
capital investors who have purchased stakes in the UK
offshore wind sector, while the underscore number refers
to the relevant offshore wind energy project. A list of the
projects that were considered for the analysis is presented
in Appendix A. Figure 2 indicates the composition of the
different investor classes found in each cluster along with
the mean values of the observations applying to each
cluster.
Finding the suitable number of clusters can be
determined through a variety of statistical methods. Yet,
the clustering should ultimately fit the purpose of the
analysis [2, 10] to conceptually support the relevance of
the objects of the same cluster. A three-cluster solution
was thus adopted and the distinct investor strategy
scenarios are documented below:
i) Late entry investors
The first group of investors primarily comprises third
party capital investors. Third party financing originates
from investors seeking to contribute equity capital without
having an involvement on the core activities of the asset.
Corporate investors (Marubeni corporation, BlackRock
Investment Management, TCW), infrastructure funds
(Green Investment Bank) and institutional investors
(Development Bank of Japan, AMF Pensionsförkäkring)
tend to be late entry investors, buying equity stakes usually
a few years after the plant is fully commissioned or, less
often, during the late construction phase. The strategy of
institutional investors is traditionally based on undertaking
exclusively operational risks and avoiding construction
risks, retaining a low risk profile with stable returns [6].
The purchased stakes are in general minority stakes (a
mean value of 40.7% stake was calculated as shown in
Fig.2) and the exit timing is usually long term, most
frequently surpassing the 5 year-warranty period of the
offshore wind farm. A representative case is the
consortium consisted of Green Investment Bank and
BlackRock Investment Management in the Lynn and Inner
Dowsing offshore wind project, who purchased 61% and
39% equity stake respectively, from Centrica and EIG
Global Energy Partners during the 7th year of operation of
the above offshore wind project, while Centrica is
committed to purchase 100% of the power produced and
50% of the Renewable Obligation Certificates until 2024
[11]. A 49.9% equity stake was sold to Marubeni
Corporation on operation year 1 of the Gunfleet Sands
wind farm, while 2 years later the Development Bank of
Japan purchased the 25% of Marubeni’s stake.
ii) Pre-commissioning investors
Independent energy companies (AMEC Offshore wind
power, Statkraft, Warwick Energy & Partners, Shell
WindEnergy, Eurus Energy, Ecoventures, SLP energy,
Eclipse Energy, WIND Prospect Ltd, Enxco AS, Zilkha
Renewable Energy), as well as EPCI (Engineering,
Procurement, Construction and Installation) contractors,
Figure 1 Dendrogram of clusters of organizations divesting stakes of offshore wind energy assets
A A’
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
and Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) (GE
Wind and Samsung Heavy Industries, GREP, SLP and
Shell Wind Energy) are the majority of investors included
in this cluster. Investors in this cluster enter the investment
at the beginning of the project’s lifecycle, usually from the
tendering process of the offshore wind site; the exit timing
also takes place prior the commissioning of the wind farm
either during the pre-construction (Consent submission,
consent authorization, pre-construction period) or during
the construction period. The exit year often coincides with
the year of disinvestment suggesting that the percentage of
stakes disinvested usually amounts to 100%, with the
exception of SLP energy and Ecoventures, who have
initially disinvested half their stake from Sheringham
Shoal project during the initiation of the project
(preconstruction phase) and the rest of their stake during
the construction stage. On the other hand, the SeaScape
Energy joint venture formed to develop the later called
Burbo Bank was a venture among: Zilkha Renewable
Energy, Enxo AS and WIND Prospect Ltd. Nevertheless,
the full ownership and development rights were sold to
DONG Energy during the preconstruction stage of the
asset.
iii) Own-build-transfer investors
The third group represents investors/project developers
who tend not to divest their assets once fully permitted or
constructed; rather, they prefer to keep the operating assets
in their balance sheet and divest part of their stake
(minority stakes) during the operating stage of the asset.
The majority of this group consists of Major Utilities like
DONG Energy, RWE, Vattenfall, SSE Renewables and
E.ON and Independent power producers. As such, this
cluster tends to invest equity from the licensing period,
work on the development and operation of the wind farm,
and divest minority stakes usually during the construction
period; holding, however, their remaining share of equity
capital for longer periods. Nevertheless, this cluster also
includes investors who act as turnkey developers entering
the venture at an early stage of its lifecycle, in order to get
involved in the construction and installation stage, and
following a few years after the project is fully
commissioned, they tend to sell the majority (if not the
entire) stake they own exiting during the operating stage of
the asset. A representative example of such an investor
type is Centrica acting as a turnkey developer, assuming
the project development risks, running the wind farm for
the first years of its operation and exit usually before the
end of the 5-year warranty period provided from the wind
turbine manufacturer (OEM) [12].
IV. SWOT ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENT PROFILES OF
INVESTORS’ STRATEGIES
A SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and
Threats) analysis was further developed in order to map
the characteristics of the different investor strategies.
A. SWOT analysis of “late-entry investors”
As shown in Fig. 2 Corporate investors, infrastructure
funds and institutional investors account for approximately
70% of the “late entry investors” cluster. Institutional
investors consist of pension and life insurance funds.
Infrastructure funds’ motivation to join the sector is driven
by a requirement to promote green energy; hence, they
typically invest during the late construction or early
operation of the wind farm contributing corporate
financing and using their corporate WACC to evaluate the
investment.
Strengths: Institutional investors and infrastructure
funds typically manage very large amounts of money
(mostly in the scale of billions). Institutional investors are
interested in owning projects during their operating life
and the cost of capital for this class of investors lies in the
region of 6%-12% [6, 13]. This group benefit from the lack
of construction risk and known factors that affect
operational risks (thoroughly investigated through due
diligence reports). Institutional investors are interested in
Figure 2 Composition of Owner classes in each cluster
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making long term investments so as to meet their
commitments in terms of pension and insurance claims [6].
Weaknesses: Because of the nature of their business
model, third party financing investors are low risk, low
return investors. They require warranties (mostly from
partners power producers) to cover risks such as power
price, construction, variability of wind speeds and O&M
costs; however, this results in relatively low returns (low
profit margins) also due to unanticipated contingencies.
Institutional investors are generally unexperienced in
directly investing in infrastructure projects and hence need
to employ high cost due diligence surveys in order to
evaluate the investment and account for entailed risks
when taking on stakes during the operating stage [6].
Nevertheless, recently under project finance deals,
infrastructure and institutional funds have started taking
construction risks while working together with major
power producers who can evaluate in detail the entailed
risks. A representative example is PGGM & Ampere
Equity Fund refinancing of their 24.8% stake bought from
Dong Energy in Walney offshore wind farm [14].
Opportunities: Offshore wind can be a suitable
investment for corporate and institutional investors for a
number of reasons. Considering the costs of due diligence
and their business model orientation, managing fewer
large-scale investments is more cost-effective than
numerous cheaper ones. Additionally, pension and
insurance funds are suitable for providing financing to
investments yielding long term returns (until investees
claim their life insurance or pension), constituting a good
match with the offshore wind energy investments, whose
revenues are paid out over the lifetime of the asset (namely
20-25 years), while the break-even of the investment has
already taken place and the institutional funds can fulfill
their liabilities [6].
Threats: The investment period usually exceeds the
subsidy contract period, following which revenues are
calculated based on undefined market electricity spot
prices. Therefore, the period beyond which power sales are
contracted, called merchant tail [15], is difficult to predict,
impeding the accurate estimation of the internal rate of
return of the project. There are still no reference projects
to allow for a confident estimation of decommissioning
costs and further for an accurate assessment of O&M costs
of assets within the second half of their service life.
B. SWOT analysis of “Pre-commissioning investors”
The second cluster comprises mostly of independent
power producers and OEMs/ECPI providers. Independent
power producers (IPPs) develop, construct and operate
offshore wind energy projects; accordingly, they usually
sell the generated energy to the grid or to large scale power
providers through Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs).
Nevertheless, there is a considerable number of IPPs
(found in the 3rd cluster), tending to keep the operating
assets on their balance sheet or divest smaller stakes.
OEMs/ECPI providers bring technical expertise not only
during the construction and installation stage of the project
but also during the maintenance operations of the wind
farm. Nevertheless, above stakeholders contribute equity
capital mainly up to the construction and early operation.
Strengths: IPPs with a background in the offshore oil &
gas industry (such as Shell) can bring their long experience
in the sector. OEMs/ECPI providers’ investment strategy
is aligned to their business model, gaining profit margins
from the installation, manufacture and maintenance of the
wind farm. The latter type of investor has the flexibility to
consider building a higher-CAPEX asset (more
conservative designs through higher material factors in
accordance to Industrial Standards [16]) aiming at
reducing the OPEX associated with inspections and
maintenance (by increasing the intervals between
consecutive inspections) and accordingly increase the
value of the asset aiming at selling it to another investor at
a higher price. OEMs dominate the offshore wind O&M
activity and the main reason is the warranties that are sold
alongside the procurement of the turbines. These
warranties refer to minimum levels of availability and have
a typical duration of five years [12].
Weaknesses: IPPs do not have as strong balance sheets
as Utility companies and their cost of capital lies in the
region of 10-20% (with the exception of IPPs with a
background in the offshore oil & gas industry) [6]. They,
therefore, seek for third party financing or sell their
consent-authorized projects to other parties able to inject
cash for the construction of the wind farm, keeping part of
the ownership. OEMs and EPCI providers invest equity
primarily to ensure the sales of their equipment and
technical services for the project; nevertheless, projects
they invest equity in, need to be reliable in order to fulfill
certain return requirements [17]; indicative risk adjusted
return of this class of investor lies between 12-14% [13].
OEMs and EPCI contractors with weak balance sheets
typically do not intend to be long-term owners; they,
rather, exit either during the construction, commission or a
few years following the commission of the asset. However,
they may be required by the debt covenants not to divest
their stake at an early stage and therefore usually
investment in offshore wind projects are taken by
OEMs/EPCI providers with strong balance sheets.
Opportunities: EPCI providers and OEMs can mitigate
risks by providing turnkey solutions and demonstrating
successful track records in their balance sheets, which will
contribute to attract new sources of equity and debt
funding. Although multi-contracting might be an attractive
solution to sponsors, lenders prefer to reduce contract
interface risks (increasing counterparty risks) [6].
Following the 5-year warranty period, increasing
opportunities for ECPI providers and OEMs are disclosed
to increase their market share, diversifying their business
and secure additional revenues [18]. Independent power
producers’ need for capital can also attract financing
innovation. By bringing their experience in renewable
energy projects, they can create partnerships with equity
providers who lack the technical knowledge, such as
institutional investors and infrastructure funds.
Threats: OEMs face barriers related to entry in the
supply chain due to the significance of the reputation of the
firm, keeping the supply of main equipment closed to large
manufacturers such as Vestas and Siemens (~65% of total
installed capacity) [6]. A study conducted by Deloitte [18]
highlighted that one of the biggest challenges in the wind
services sector is the lack of qualified technicians to
undertake O&M activities.
Table 2 SWOT analysis key points
St
re
ng
th
s
“Late-entry investors”
- Large amounts of money
available
- Lower cost of capital
- No construction risk
- Known operational risks (due
diligence reports)
“Pre-commissioning investors”
- IPPs from the offshore oil &
gas experience in the sector
- OEMs/EPCI providers have
flexibility to decide on the
specifications of the asset
influencing its future value
“Own-build-transfer investors”
- Major utilities hold a strong
position in offshore wind
energy
- Strong balance sheets
- High competence through the
whole value chain of the
offshore wind asset
- Vertical integration
W
ea
kn
es
se
s
“Late-entry investors”
- Risk adverse
- No opportunity to
influence
specifications of the
structure
- High costs for
conducting due
diligence surveys
“Pre-commissioning
investors”
- OEMs and EPCI
providers lack the
financial strength to
finance the project
“Own-build-transfer
investors”
- Financial crisis has
impacted financial
performance of
Utilities
O
pp
or
tu
ni
tie
s
“Late-entry investors”
- More efficient to manage a few
large scale investments rather
than many smaller ones (e.g.
due to due diligence reports);
- Matching of asset’s long term
returns with liabilities of
institutional investors (such as
pension funds)
“Pre-commissioning investors”
- OEMs/EPCI providers ensure
sales of their equipment and
O&M services;
- OEMs/EPCI providers can
provide turnkey solutions to
attract financing from
institutional and infrastructure
funds
“Own-build-transfer investors”
- Political support for offshore
wind;
- Strategic agreements
Th
re
at
s
“Late-entry investors”
- No reference projects
to estimate
decommissioning
costs and late O&M
costs
- Uncertainty during the
merchant tail period
“Pre-commissioning
investors”
- High competition to
enter the supply chain
“Own-build-transfer
investors”
- Competitive
environment
- Risk management of
the project
C. SWOT analysis of “Own-build-transfer investors”
The Own-build-transfer group is dominated by major
Utilities, Independent energy companies and Sovereign
wealth funds.
Strengths: Utilities hold a very strong position in
offshore wind energy market. Their strategy focuses on
developing the offshore wind farm from the initial stage,
and operate it following its commission, divesting mostly
minority stakes to institutional and infrastructure investors
after a few years of operation. Major Utilities follow a
vertical integration business model, operating across the
value chain from energy production to retail and trading
(to end customers), which drives synergies and places a
competitive advantage of the company, while also meeting
the requirements under the Renewable Obligations
scheme. They are able to finance the project from their
own reserves or through corporate finance at a low cost of
capital (~8-10%) [6]. Sovereign wealth funds are state
funds and hence their cost is typically low, while they
typically have large amount of capital to invest in their
disposal.
Weaknesses: Although Utilities still dominate the
offshore wind energy market, their financial performance
has been impacted by the financial crisis, and they hence
need to look for other sources of equity and debt financing.
To this end, other financing schemes are gaining
popularity such as project financing and joint ventures.
Opportunities: The political consensus on promoting
clean energy technologies creates great opportunities for
big energy companies to participate in the transformation
of the energy system. Opportunities lie within the creation
of strategic agreements and partnerships, as well as the
reduction of the cost of energy.
Threats: Stakeholders within this group operate under
a competitive environment, while since they get involved
from the development to the operation stage, they need to
manage all risks entailed: complex approval processes
causing delays or higher payments, regulatory/policy risks
related to the uncertainties in policy support schemes,
counterparty risks either from equipment/O&M services
suppliers or from PPAs not kept, revenue variability due to
the intermittency issues or/and due to the grid availability,
and electricity price risk, among others [19].
V. DISCUSSION
Results of the cluster analysis have highlighted the
existence of three distinct clusters. Considering that the
earlier developed wind farms are now reaching the middle
of their service lives, i.e. approximately 10 years, we might
expect to see another cluster forming concerning investors
choosing to enter or exit the market as the assets approach
the end of their service life with the view to repowering or
proceeding to the service life extension of the assets. This
paradigm has been observed in onshore wind energy assets
where a secondary market has developed. Moving on to
the next generation to offshore wind energy assets, their
potential to allow multiple entry/exit points could be built
in even from the planning and design stage.
Typical example comprises the potential decision to
employ appropriate provisions of standards to initially
over-design the assets or decide to install appropriate
integrity monitoring systems with a view to reduce
required inspection and unplanned maintenance, hence
reducing expected CAPEX. Such an approach will also
allow certification, which is a pertinent provision towards
transferring risks during operation.
It becomes apparent that evaluating an offshore wind
energy project needs to take into account the presence of
risk, through appropriate analytical methods [20]. For
instance, common industry practice in order to account for
the uncertainty in electricity prices after the 15 years
(during which revenues are determined by the strike price
secured) is to apply forward curves to predict future
electricity prices and sensitivity analysis in key input
parameters, such as cost of capital, CAPEX and OPEX
components, etc.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the offshore wind energy market expands and the
number of operating wind farms increases, commercial
aspects begin to receive a lot of attention. Currently,
investors from different backgrounds and with different
strategies seek for opportunity instances throughout the
lifecycle of the asset to invest by purchasing stake of the
ownership and contribute equity capital. To better
understand whether specific trends can be observed by the
different stakeholders, we performed a cluster analysis,
where objects were assumed to be investors who have
purchased stake in offshore wind energy projects and the
observations were the entry timing, exit timing, purchase
timing and stake purchased. This process indicated three
distinct clusters: the late-entry investors, the pre-
commissioning investors and the Own-build-transfer
investors.
Late-entry investors represent corporate investors,
infrastructure funds and institutional investors who tend to
invest equity capital a few years following the
commissioning of the plant or, less often, during the late
construction. Being, on the most part, a risk adverse group
of stakeholders, they tend to avoid construction risks. Long
term returns of offshore wind energy assets match with the
long term liabilities of institutional investors (such as
pension funds), while the high costs of due diligence
reports urge third party financing stakeholders to prefer
investing in fewer capital intensive assets rather than
numerous less expensive ones.
Pre-commissioning investors include independent
energy companies and OEMs/EPCI contractors, who enter
the venture at the beginning of the project’s lifecycle, in
order to contribute their technical expertise and knowledge
deriving from long term experience in the development of
energy projects. An additional incentive for OEMs to
invest in the early stage of the development of the wind
farm is to ensure the sales of their equipment as well as the
O&M contracts of the wind farm. This group usually lacks
the balance sheet strength (with the exception of large oil
and gas IPPs) to provide large amounts of equity and rely
on third party financing for the funding of the project.
Finally, “Own-build-transfer investors” represent
principally Utilities; however, IPPs and Sovereign wealth
funds were also found to follow a similar trend in terms of
the examined criteria. In general, Utilities hold a very
strong position in offshore wind energy market operating
across the value chain of the wind energy asset. Their
strategy focuses on developing the offshore wind farm
from the initial stage, and operate it following its
commission, divesting mostly minority stakes to
institutional and infrastructure investors after a few years
of operation.
Similar clusters can also be observed in the offshore oil
and gas industry where assets have been operated
significantly beyond the end of their service life and an
additional cluster is present offering opportunity to invest
or disinvest as the assets approach their nominal service
life.
APPENDIX
A. OFFSHORE WIND ENERGY PROJECTS
1.Greater Gabbard 15. Lincs
2. Lynn and Inner
Dowsing
16. London Array Phase One
3. Barrow 17. Teesside
4. Gunfleet Sands 1
& 2
18. West of Duddon Sands
5.Robin Rigg 19. Gwynt Y Mor
6. Thanet 20. Humber Gateway
7. Walney 1 21. Kentish Flats Extension
8. North Hoyle 22. Levenmouth Demonstration
Turbine (Energy Park Fife)
9. Kentish Flats 23. Westermost Rough
10. Rhyl Flats 24. Scroby Sands
11. Burbo Bank 25. Beatrice Demonstrator
12. Ormonde 26. Blyth Offshore
13. Sheringham
Shoal
27. Gunfleet Sands
Demonstration Project
14. Walney 2
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work was supported by grant EP/L016303/1 for
Cranfield University, Centre for Doctoral Training in
Renewable Energy Marine Structures (REMS)
(http://www.rems-cdt.ac.uk/) from the UK Engineering
and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC).
REFERENCES
[1] DECC, 2014. Contract for Difference : allocation process 
high level summary.
[2] Spyridaki, N.-A., Ioannou, A. and Flamos, A., 2016. How
Can the Context Affect Policy Decision-Making: The Case
of Climate Change Mitigation Policies in the Greek
Building Sector. Energies 2016, 9(4), 294;
doi:10.3390/en9040294
[3] Wind Europe, 2017. The European offshore wind industry,
Key trends and statistics 2016. January 2017.
[4] Crown Estate, Offshore wind electricity map. Available at:
https://www.thecrownestate.co.uk/energy-minerals-and-
infrastructure/offshore-wind-energy/offshore-wind-
electricity-map/ (Accessed 02/2017)
[5] Ioannou A., Angus, A., Brennan, F., 2016. “Stochastic
Prediction of Offshore Wind Farm LCOE through an
Integrated Cost Model”. Energy Procedia 107C (2017) pp.
383-389. DOI: 10.1016/j.egypro.2016.12.180.
[6] EWEA (European Wind Energy Association), 2013.
Where's the money coming from? Financing offshore wind
farms. November 2013.
[7] Levitt, A. C., Kemptona W., Smithb, A. P., Musial W.,
Firestone, J., 2011. Pricing offshore wind power. Energy
Policy 39 (2011) 6408–6421.
[8] Mooi, E., Sarstedt, M., 2010. Cluster Analysis BT - A
Concise Guide to Market Research: The Process, Data, and
Methods Using IBM SPSS Statistics. Chapter 9, pages 237-
284.
[9] 4C Offshore Wind Industry Database:
www.4coffshore.com. (Accessed 02/2017)
[10] Köbrich, C.; Rehman, T.; Khan, M. Typification of farming
systems for constructing representative farm models: Two
illustrations of the application of multi-variate analyses in
Chile and Pakistan. Agric. Syst. 2003, 76, 141–157.
[11] OffshoreWIND.biz. Centrica and EIG Sell Lynn and Inner
Dowsing OWFs. Available at:
http://www.offshorewind.biz/2016/02/05/centrica-and-eig-
sell-lynn-and-inner-dowsing-owfs/ Posted on February 5,
2016 (Accessed 02/2017).
[12] Garrad Hassan GL, 2013. A guide to UK offshore wind
operations and maintenance. Scottish Enterprise and The
Crown Estate, UK
[13] The Crown Estate, 2015. UK Offshore Wind: Opportunities
for trade and investment. May 2015.
[14] PGGM. PGGM & Ampere Equity Fund refinancing of their
24.8% stake in the 367 MW Walney offshore wind farm in
the Irish Sea. Available at:
https://www.pggm.nl/english/who-we-
are/press/Pages/PGGM--Ampere-Equity-Fund-refinancing-
of-their-24-8-stake--in-the-367-MW-Walney-offshore-
wind-farm-in-the-Irish-Sea.aspx (Accessed 02/2017)
[15] US Department of Energy. (2008). Annual report on U.S.
wind power installation, cost and performance. Trends
2007. Energy efficiency and renewable energy
[16] DNV (2014). Offshore Standard. DNV-OS-J101. Design of
Offshore Wind Turbine Structures. May 2014.
[17] Global Capital Finance and Clean Energy Pipeline, 2014.
The European Renewable Energy Investor Landscape.
[18] Deloitte, 2012. European Wind Services Study. Find out
which way the wind blows. August 2012.
[19] Gatzert, N. and Kosub, T. “Risks and risk management of
renewable energy projects: The case of onshore and
offshore wind parks”, Renewable and Sustainable Energy
Reviews, Volume 60, July 2016, Pages 982-998.
[20] Ioannou, A., Angus, A., Brennan, F. “Risk-based methods
for sustainable energy system planning: A review”,
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Volume 74,
July 2017, Pages 602-615.
